Digital Archaeology: Undergraduate Philosophy Paper: Descartes's Third Meditation: Does God Exist?
(The following is an undergraduate philosophy paper I wrote during my time as a philosophy student at Sonoma State University, circa 1999–2000. For historical purposes I have kept this paper as-is, flaws and all.)
In the third meditation of Descartes, following the proof of his own existence in the previous meditations, Descartes presents an argument for the existence of what he calls a "res ens perfectissimum," or "most perfect being." That definition of this being, which will henceforth be called God, is crucial to understanding the proof of that very being. In this analysis I will present the argument of Descartes, offer criticism based upon what I have viewed as the weakest points in the argument, and attempt to defend the argument against those very criticisms.
Let us first examine a very concise representation of the argument presented by Descartes in this meditation. The argument is presented thusly:
We have the idea of God within us (i.e. that of a most perfect being, infinite, omniscient, et cetera.)
Ideas must be caused by something containing the essence of that idea within it.
The idea of a perfect being must therefore be caused by something containing perfection.
I (i.e. Descartes) am not perfect and therefore cannot be the cause of this idea of God.
Therefore, because of the above premises, there must exist a being containing the properties of a "most perfect being."
Because God is defined as the "most perfect being" and a most perfect being must necessarily exist, God must logically exist.
Given the truth of all of the premises in the above argument, the conclusion is likely to follow logically. Therefore it seems prudent to begin a criticism of this argument by attacking the truth-value of Descartes' premises.
The second premise in the above argument is arguably one of the most critical to the soundness of the argument because the truth-value of the other premises (i.e. 3 and 4), both rest upon its truth-value (i.e. if it can be shown that the second premise is false, then the third and fourth premises must also be false.)
I believe an excellent example, which may, superficially, appear to negate the truth of the second premise is Plato's contention in the Phaedo that all things are generated from their opposites. Just as the concept of hotness can only exist, and therefore have meaning, because of the existence of the concept of coldness (i.e. its opposite), the same reasoning may be used to show that the idea of a "most perfect being" must, in fact, despite Descartes' assertion to the contrary, be generated via something imperfect. Thus, it would appear that it is indeed possible for an imperfect being to be the cause of a perfect idea.
However, this criticism of Descartes' argument takes on a new light when the line of reasoning is used in the opposite direction. If it were true that all things are generated via their opposites, it is necessary to state that imperfect things must arise from perfect things, leading back to the existence of a "most perfect being" once again. From this example, we are left with three situations, which must be considered. The first, and certainly the easiest, is that Descartes is correct in saying that ideas can only be caused by other things possessing the qualities within those ideas. The second, by way of Plato's argument and its use as a criticism of Descartes' second premise, is that the perfect ideas in the mind of man, must necessarily be caused by something imperfect (i.e. mankind itself.) The third is that, once again, Plato's assertion is correct and the imperfect ideas contained in the mind of man, the existence of which is both clearly and distinctly perceived by Descartes, must necessarily be caused by something perfect (i.e. God.)
The second and third situations above present a contradiction. By use of the same reasoning, opposite conclusions are reached, which is indicative of a fault in the reasoning of Plato and, consequently, its use as a criticism of Descartes' second premise. Thus, it seems that Descartes' premise is able to withstand this particular criticism and, therefore, a different type of critique must be used in order to show Descartes' argument to be unsound.
There appears to be a fundamental flaw in the concept of God, which Descartes has introduced. Infinity and perfection, Descartes says, are qualities which a "most perfect being' must necessarily possess. However, it may be argued that a being cannot be both infinite and perfect. To be perfect connotes an awareness of both right and wrong (i.e. a moral standard) and consequently, in order to obtain perfection, a rejection of all that is evil. But, an infinite being must not only be infinitely good, but also infinitely evil, for to be infinite a being must encompass all that exists, both good and evil. Restated in a different manner, it is impossible for a perfect being to be infinite because of the lack of the possibly of imperfection, and the nature of infinity is such that it encompasses all possibilities.
By using the same reasoning as Descartes used in his above proof, it may be shown that both a "most 'perfect' being" and an infinite being must exist, because both perfect and infinite are absolute qualities which we, as humans, do not possess but nevertheless have ideas of. However, these cannot be the same being because of the inconsistencies cited in the previous paragraph.
Therefore, one of two conclusions may be reached from this criticism. First, because of the inconsistencies contained within Descartes' conception of a "most perfect being" (i.e. one which is both infinite and perfect), and the fact that this conception is crucial to the soundness of the proof, it may be concluded that his argument, as presented, is unsound. In contrast, if one separates the ideas of perfection and infinity and performs the same argument with each of those concepts instead of the inconsistent one, it can be concluded that there is, in fact, both a perfect being and an infinite being in the universe. While this conclusion is admittedly counter-intuitive, it does appear to follow from the reasoning used by Descartes.
The third and final criticism which will be offered in this paper, is regarding the nature of the being whose existence was argued for by Descartes. Because of the necessary existence of a "most perfect being," Descartes makes the claim that this perfect being must have an existence beyond his own existence. However, there is nothing, save intuition, which logically rules out the possibility of Descartes himself being the perfect being and, consequently, the cause of the idea of the perfect thing which he has in his mind. Admittedly, this seems an unlikely conclusion considering that a perfect being would ideally know if it were perfect. But since Descartes claimed to have proven the existence of a perfect being outside of himself, it must be noted that presents no contradiction to say that he (i.e. Descartes) himself is a perfect being and is consequently responsible for the idea of that very same being. And while, as mentioned above, a most perfect being would probably have knowledge of its own perfection, it may be argued that, given the distinction between perfect and infinite, knowledge of perfection may very well belong to the category of "infinite things," as opposed to "perfect things." And because of this distinction, and its resulting loophole, the existence of God is not necessarily proven because there is no requirement that the perfect being exist outside of one's mind. Descartes would say that the fact of his own imperfection is among the few things in the universe which may be regarded as "clear and distinct," but when the above distinction between perfection and infinity is taken into account, it becomes possible, using Descartes' exact premises to argue that there exists an infinite being outside of the human mind. This is a result of many logical, albeit, complex consequences of Descartes' own premises. Firstly, given the above analysis, it may be proven that the human mind may be responsible for its own sense of perfection, but not for its sense of infinity, since if it were responsible for its own sense of infinity, it would surely have knowledge of that same infinity. However, given the criticism that perfection implies a moral standard as opposed to an all-encompassing state of being, self knowledge is no longer a requirement for perfection (i.e. knowledge has been classified under the category of infinite instead), and there is no longer any way for one to rule out one's self as the perfect being. Therefore, as a proof of the existence of a "most perfect being," Descartes' proof appears to have not taken everything into account, and is also full of several inconsistencies, which may be highly unlikely, but still do appear to follow from his premises. In effect, while my first and second criticisms of Descartes' argument focused on specific premises, this criticism has served to illustrate the logical inconsistencies contained within Descartes' argument, which is also indicative of the unsoundness of his argument.
As a rationalist, it is likely that Descartes would appeal to the principle that the simplest conclusion tends to be the correct one. And consequently, since his solution is quite elegant and "clear and distinct," that that quality itself makes the truth of his conclusion much more likely. It also seems likely that the distinction between infinite and perfect, which I have illustrated here, would not be among the clear and distinct ideas he is aware of. Descartes, it would seem, would likely argue that perfection, and consequently the results of pure goodness and non-deception, is more important to his argument than the idea of an infinite being. This is because it is not difficult to conceive of an "infinitely perfect" being, which is not necessarily "infinite" in the sense I have illustrated in my criticism above. This would allow his proof to remain intact, on the stipulation that he discard the idea of a completely infinite being, lest the possibility of an evil genius work its way back into the picture.
In conclusion, aside from the inconsistencies associated with Descartes' conception of God and their resulting counter-intuitive conclusions, Descartes' reasoning seems to be fairly sound. And while his "proof" may not have proven the existence of God in an empirical sense, I am forced (not reluctantly because I am, in fact, a Cartesian) to concede that Descartes has hit upon some very fundamental truths about the nature of the universe (i.e. the existence of self and God.) Yet, despite the subtle flaws in this argument, it seems that with the addition or manipulation of one or more premises may eliminate the difficulties all together. I do believe Descartes was on the right track, however, and find the existence of God to be (for lack of a better phrase) a "clear and distinct" idea.
